Izabela Jelovac

CNRS-GATE Lyon-Saint-Etienne, France

Awad Mataria

Izabela Jelovac is a Research Professor at CNRS affiliated with GATE Lyon–Saint-Étienne. Her research lies at the intersection of health economics, public economics, industrial organization, and applied microeconomics. She has developed a substantial body of work on the organization and regulation of health care systems, with particular attention to physician incentives, pharmaceutical pricing, health insurance design, and the strategic behavior of health-care providers and patients.

Her contributions combine rigorous theoretical analysis with policy-relevant applications. Across her publications, she has examined issues such as competition and pricing in prescription drug markets, the effects of patient cost-sharing, the design of approval and reimbursement mechanisms for new drugs, and the role of incentives in shaping medical decision-making and health-care delivery. This work speaks directly to major contemporary debates on health-system efficiency, regulation, and access to care.

At GATE, her profile highlights a broad research agenda spanning health economics, public economics, industrial organization, and applied microeconomics, reflecting her longstanding engagement with analytically grounded and policy-oriented economic research.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS 

Generic entry, price competition, and market segmentation in the prescription drug market–A comment

I Jelovac International Journal of Industrial Organization, 103218, 2025

In this note, we revise the theoretical condition in Regan (2008) under which the price of brand-name drugs increases with the number of generic competitors—a phenomenon known as the generic paradox. We show that this condition derives from the analysis of an interior solution while it actually excludes the existence of an interior solution. Therefore,...

2025

Adoption of AI-based predictive testing: Disentangling acceptability from confidence

R Bourlès, I Jelovac, I Rafaï, B Ventelou Available at SSRN 5557538, 2025

In this paper, we disentangle aversion to AI from relative confidence towards this new technology by structurally estimating a model of disease testing decision. Adapting a model of neo-capacities and using data from a discrete choice experiment in the field of neuro-degenerative diseases, we measure both confidence and aversion towards AI-based testing compared to biological...

2025

The pricing of physicians' services with distant medicine and health insurance

E Dargaud, I Jelovac

Telemedicine is often put forward as a solution to medical deserts. Recently, telemedicine has allowed to limit physical contacts during a pandemic. We analyze within a theoretical model the setting of physicians' fees in the presence of distant medicine and public health insurance, as well as the resulting patients' surplus, access and public expenses. Concretely,...

2023

Research funding and price negotiation for new drugs

F Barigozzi, I Jelovac Health Economics 29, 83-96, 2020

This paper analyzes the negotiation process, which leads to basic research funding and price setting for new drugs in regulated health insurance markets. Its results bring answers to the following questions: Should basic research be privately funded, publicly funded, or produced by an independent lab? Under which conditions is public integration of basic research efficient?...

2020

Regulation and altruism

I Jelovac, S Kembou Nzale Journal of Public Economic Theory 22 (1), 49-68, 2020

We study optimal contracts in a regulator–agent setting with joint production, altruistic and selfish agents, limited liability, and uneasy outcome measurement. Such a setting represents sectors of activities such as education and healthcare provision. The agents and the regulator jointly produce an outcome for which they all care to some extent that is varying from...

2020

Comparing approval procedures for new drugs

N Houy, I Jelovac The World Economy 42 (5), 1598-1619, 2019

We analyse how drug approval procedures influence the incentives of pharmaceutical firms to commercialise new drugs in the presence of international reference pricing. Since 1995, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) coordinates a centralised approval procedure for specific new drugs in the EU. With such a centralised procedure, the EMA grants simultaneous drug approvals for all...

2019

Preliminary draft. Comments welcome. Do not post or share without permission.

RP Ellis, I Jelovac

Notably lacking in the health care innovation literature is sufficient recognition of the key role that doctors and hospitals play in choosing health care quantity, quality, and in some cases, prices. If providers can freely choose all three, then the profit maximum for a fixed patient type is one in which patient willingness-to-pay (WTP) is...

2019
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